In a judgement
pronounced by the
Hon’ble Delhi High
Court on November 19,
2012, promotions of
officers of the rank of
Major General (Maj.
Gen.) to Lieutenant
General (Lt. Gen.)
approved by a Special
Selection Board held on
January 7, 2011 were
quashed, mainly on the
ground that the revised
Quantification Policy
(QP) forming the basis
FOR the selection was
not approved by the
Ministry of Defence
(MoD) and, therefore,
lacked legality. The
Hon’ble Court also
directed that a fresh
Special Selection Board
(SSB) must be held to
assess the officers on
the basis of QP dated
December 31, 2008.
Whereas the judgement
may not benefit the
petitioners for various
reasons, it is a timely
reminder to Army
Headquarters (AHQ)
and MoD that
promotion policies
should not be tinkered
with every change of
personality at the helm
of affairs. The
quantification model
itself spells out
selection criteria for
greater objectivity and
helps in selecting the
most deserving officers
for higher rank from
among a batch of
officers. This Issue Brief
analyses the officers’
promotion policy in the
Indian Army. The
arbitrary change in the
QP is not the only
aberration in the
system. The system is
by and large fair but
needs to be freed from
the proclivities of the
military leadership
itself. The subject is
examined at the
following levels:
(a) Career ambition of
voluntary officer corps.
(b) Importance of
Annual Confidential
Reports (ACRs) in
officers’ career
progression.
(c) Systemic problems
afflicting the process of
selection of officers for
higher ranks.
Career Ambition of
Voluntary Officer Corps
Service in the Indian
Armed Forces is
voluntary. Therefore,
all officers who join the
armed forces are either
permanent
commissioned officers
or are granted
permanent commission
after expiry of the
short-service
commission period.
Therefore, all officers
who rise in the
profession to attain
higher ranks do so in a
highly competitive
environment, given the
pyramidal nature of the
rank structure. This
needs to be seen in
light of a longer period
of service that higher
ranks afford and the
consequent impact on
prestige and financial
remuneration. The
anxieties further get
heightened because
there are lesser
avenues for alternate
employment for a large
number of army
officers retiring every
year. The shortage of
officers in the army
does not leave enough
time for them to pursue
academic or
professional training,
which empowers them
for employment post
retirement. This
problem becomes more
acute after the age of
50, when appropriate
employment
opportunities diminish.
Importance of ACRs in
Officers’ Career
Progression
The inputs before the
Selection Board for
empanelling officers for
higher ranks are
confidential reports
(CRs), performance on
training courses,
honours and awards,
value judgement and
negative inputs such as
poor disciplinary
awards. Of these
inputs, CRs normally
constitute
approximately 90 per
cent of the total
weightage. In the past,
spoken reputation and
employability in the
higher rank of the
officer being assessed
was also taken into
consideration before
making the
recommendation about
his suitability for
further promotion.
However, after the
Quantification Model
was introduced in 2008,
these inputs were by
and large ignored. The
operational
performance of an
officer against an
external threat and in
counter-insurgency
operations provides an
important input.
Therefore, CRs form the
most important input in
the Selection Board.
This has been the case
for a very long time.
Major Hoshiar Singh
who earned a Param
Vir Chakra in the 1971
India-Pakistan War
retired as a Colonel
because he was graded
poorly in his CR
initiated when he was
serving as a Battalion
Commander at the
National Defence
Academy.
The ACR system and its
impact on an officer’s
career progression is
often criticised on the
grounds that it breeds
sycophancy and induces
sacrifice of moral
courage merely to get a
good CR. However, the
fact remains that the
CR system is well-
designed since the
report is normally
reviewed by two
superior officers in the
chain of command,
after it is endorsed by
the initiating officer
(IO). The Reviewing
Officer (RO) and Senior
Reviewing Officer (SRO)
are required to
moderate the report
and eliminate biases of
subjective reporting.
For some time in the
1980s a closed system
of reporting was tried,
wherein the report was
not required to be
shown to the ratee
(officer reported upon)
unless there was an
adverse comment in
the CR. This created
anxiety among the
officers; those not
empanelled for the
next rank were forced
to initiate complaints
only after their non-
empanelment, thus not
providing them an
opportunity to seek
redress after the
initiation of CRs. It was
also felt that a closed
system generated
distrust between IOs
and ratees. Review of
the closed system led
to the re-introduction
of the present system
of open CRs. The
success of this system
was dependent upon
IOs displaying
objectivity and moral
courage. However, in
an environment where
most battalions
function at half their
authorised strength of
officers, many
commanding officers
found it difficult to
report objectively on
their officers, lest those
graded lower lost the
motivation to work
hard. A good leader is
expected to carry along
his team. However,
objective reporting
could result in some
officers under-
performing. Given the
context of poor officer
strength in units, this
could adversely impact
effective training and
administration of units.
Exceptions apart, in any
organisation at any
given time, normally
there would only be
about 20 to 30 per cent
personnel whose
performance would be
above average.
However, the limitation
of numbers has
resulted in most
officers being rated
above average or
outstanding. In the
process, the truly
outstanding or above
average officers are the
losers since there is no
incentive left in the
system except perhaps
important assignments
to which they can be
appointed. Performance
in courses like the
Defence Services Staff
College and the Junior
Command Course
remains the only
criteria that separate
the high achievers from
others. Whereas good
performance in courses
helps such officers in
tenanting prestigious
staff and instructional
appointments, however,
a very low percentage
of weightage is given to
performance on courses
in the Quantification
Model and, therefore,
they do not get
adequate compensation
in the selection
process.
The ACR system
followed by the army
is, perhaps, still the
best appraisal system in
the armed forces with
built-in checks and
balances. However, in
some cases it still tends
to be subjective,
particularly since the
ROs and SROs do not
get to see the ratees
very closely to be able
to make considered
judgement on the
latter’s performance.
Experience suggests
that an officer of high
integrity and
professional capability
cannot be denied his
due and an odd
aberration does not
repudiate this
observation. It rather
proves a point, even
though some officers
overlooked for further
promotion would
dispute this.
It would be appropriate
to cite two examples of
objective reporting
even before a formal
system of redressal of
grievances related to
CRs was instituted
within the Military
Secretary’s Branch in
the Army Headquarters
and Complaints and
Advisory Board (CAB)
was attached to the
COAS Secretariat. In
one case, wherein the
ratee was assessed
poorly by the IO, the
RO, in his observation
in the pen picture of
the rate, clearly
mentioned that the IO
had a tendency to be
subjective in his
reporting and had
failed to improve
despite being advised
in this regard. The RO
further stated that
while writing the report
on the IO, he would
endorse this adverse
remark in his report.
The CR of the junior
officer was kept
pending in the MS
Branch until receipt of
the report of the IO. It
was observed in the
report on the IO that
the RO had indeed
made an adverse
remark about the IO’s
tendency to be
subjective. The junior
officer’s ACR was then
processed and the IO’s
portion of the report
was overlooked.
In the second case, an
officer performing the
duties of a Brigade
Major – a prestigious
appointment for a
Major rank officer –
was not approved for
the rank of Lieutenant
Colonel, based on the
report of his RO, a
Brigade Commander,
when the officer was
performing the duties
of a Company
Commander in counter-
insurgency operations
in Nagaland. In this
case, whereas the IO
had graded the
Company Commander
above average, the
Brigade Commander as
RO had rated him
average in certain
qualities. While doing
so, he had explained
the rationale quite
clearly and said that
the officer had the
qualities of a good staff
officer but, based on
his close observation of
the officer’s leadership
qualities, he found him
to be an average leader
of men. This
observation was
corroborated by a low
high average
operational report
during the 1971 War
when the officer was a
Second Lieutenant.
These two incidents
highlight the fact that
the system can only
function properly if the
reporting officers have
moral courage and
adequate tenures to
observe their
subordinates in
different situations.
The Systemic
Problems Afflicting
the Process of
Selection
The problem of
commanding officers
having to run their
units efficiently with a
bare minimum number
of offices available has
been discussed earlier.
An inflationary
tendency in writing
reports has also been
highlighted. In addition,
a major systemic
problem impacts the
redressal of grievance
mechanism. This
problem has existed for
long. Way back in the
late 1980s, a Lieutenant
Colonel who was
directly related to a
very senior officer
managed to get at least
three of his CRs
‘cleaned’ after
submitting complaints
against the reports.
Although this officer
was cleared for
promotion by the
Selection Board in a
review after the reports
were cleaned,
fortunately for the
system his promotion
was not cleared by the
MoD since an upright
officer brought this
travesty to their notice.
A deeper examination
of his earlier CRs
revealed that the
officer was not up to
the mark right from the
beginning of his career.
As a result, promotion
was denied to him.
Whereas this was a
good example of the
system taking care of
aberrations, a large
number of cases do
take place wherein
some officers with
‘connections’ and
sometimes based on
parochial regimental
affiliations with Service
Chiefs or other senior
officers manage to get
relief and promotions.
The grievance redressal
mechanism is meant to
provide relief only to
the deserving
candidates; however, it
is not always fair or
adequate. In some
cases, it merely looks
at an aberration and
removes it despite the
possibility that it was
perhaps the only time
when the true worth of
an officer was reported.
To this extent it tends
to favour some people
who have already
reached their level of
incompetence. In some
other cases personal
preferences dictate
decisions. A number of
cases are fairly well
known within the army
circles and need not be
specified here.
Recently, a large
number of cases of
misdemeanour and
financial impropriety on
the part of senior army
officers has come to
light. Some
commentators have
argued that the media
is sensationalising such
issues because they
make good copy, while
others attribute
motives to some
sections in the
establishment who
want to show the army
in poor light. The merit
in these arguments
notwithstanding, it is
clear that an increasing
number of such cases
will be exposed in
future and exposure of
misdeeds is not bad in
itself. It is necessary to
recognise that there is
something wrong
somewhere and
corrective measures are
required to be taken.
Involvement of senior
officers in cases of
corruption or in other
socially unacceptable
actions brings down the
prestige of the army
and the faith of the
rank and file in the
senior leadership. While
the armed forces are
the only organ of the
state that take swift disciplinary action against defaulters, though at the cost of invaluable time and manpower resources in taking such disciplinary actions, many cases of misdemeanour go unpunished for want of substantial proof to initiate disciplinary action. Objective reporting, therefore,assumes added importance in weeding out officers of doubtful integrity and competence. The Chief of the Army Staff reports on every Major General in the Indian Army as IO, RO or SRO. The reputation of senior officers is generally known to his peers, subordinates and immediate superiors. The Chief also has the resources to brief himself on the reputation of senior officers, should he so desire. It is therefore incumbent upon him to make a definitive recommendation about
every Major General as regards suitability for promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General keeping his performance, capabilities and conduct in mind. The Chief has the authority to moderate, agree or disagree with the report of the IO or RO. Under normal circumstances, when a Major General lacks either the capabilities or if his conduct is not exemplary, the COAS should discuss the issue with the concerned Army Commander so that the officer is rated appropriately, there by denying him promotion to the next higher rank.Even if the Army Commander feels otherwise, the Chief can exercise his prerogative as the final RO, to grade the office appropriately and write his observations about the officer’s suitability for promotion unambiguously in the pen picture of the ratee.
There is no requirement of change of policy or for the Chief to assume the powers to upgrade an officer’s report. In case an officer is aggrieved by the reporting of his IO, RO or SRO, the Chief has the authority to provide relief when the officer submits a non-statutory complaint. It is unlikely that the government or the courts will go against the recommendations of the Chief, if he mentions the reasons for not recommending an officer for promotion in his report. By doing so, the Chief would do great service to the organisation by stopping the less competent and not so honest officers from rising in service. This will also send an appropriate message to all officers down the line to maintain high standards of integrity and professionalism. Over a period of time higher standards of probity and professionalism will get established, thereby benefiting the army and the country. Conclusion The reporting system in the Army is time tested and is probably the best among all the services in India.
However, there is room for improvement. It is desirable, however, that the policies are not tinkered with after every change of command and are allowed to stabilize over a period of 5 to 10 years before they are reviewed for their efficacy. Obviously, any organisation is as good as its leaders and the senior leadership in the army must display moral courage in reporting objectively, particularly on senior officers to set an example for officers lower down the chain of command. It is only when the competent and honest officers are promoted and officers with less than optimal professional competence and compatibility are weeded out that the senior officers in the army will start getting promoted at a comparatively younger age, which would permit them to hold their appointments for longer periods. It is absolutely essential for senior officers to holdlonger tenures so that they can influence their command positively and get to know all officers serving under them so that they can report on them objectively. Policies must have a longer shelf life and a larger number of officers outside Army Headquarters should be involved in the formulation of promotion policies since they would have a stake in making the policy a success.
Courtedy-IDSA
One day i was just wondering about the top brass of the Army and thinking to how exactly do the upper echelons of the force decide upon who gets to command what formation and who gets staff positions.Well, this was cleared when a person i actually happen to know became a Lt Gen.Well, the person in context is a very able Army officer from the Parachute Regiment of the Indian Army.On hearing the news of his promotion my question to my Dad was to which corps was that Uncle going to get , since i knew that Lt Gen went on to command Corps.To this my Dad replied that he was going on to command an Area.
